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Abstract
There has been disagreement between Norway and the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) concerning the
continued use of regional employment subsidies. ESA considers subsidies to firms in the economic base sector
of assisted areas to be incompatible with the state aid rules of the European Economic Area (EEA). The
principal view of the Norwegian Government is that implicit regional employment subsidies in the form of
differentiated payroll taxes is part of the overall tax system and central to labour market policy. Since the State
retain the power of exercising both taxation and labour policy under the EEA Agreement, the payroll tax
system is outside the competence of ESA. In this paper, the case is discussed from an economic point of view.
Likely consequences of changing the system are discussed within a conceptual model in the new economic
geography tradition where the centre-periphery structure is partly endogeneous.
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1. Introduction
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) decided July 2 1998 (Decision No. 165/98/COL) that
the Norwegian system of regionally differentiated social security contributions involves state
aid incompatible with the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the EEA Agreement).
The decision is fully supported by the European Commission (Commission’s observations in
Case E-6/98 and Dec. No. 165/98/COL p. 3). The Norwegian Government has contested the
decision and applied for annulment to the EFTA Court. At time of writing, on May 20 1999,
the Court dismissed the application (for details on the judgement, see Error! Bookmark not
defined.).
 The system of regionally differentiated social security contributions paid by employers is an
implementation of implicit regional labour subsidies. To appreciate the substantial importance
of the case, it is necessary to understand that labour subsidies represent the main instrument of
Norwegian regional policy. According to estimates from a study commissioned by ESA, total
benefits in 1994 were 4473 million 1994-NOK (Hervik, 1996). Admittedly, this estimate
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exaggerates the cost savings to the firm for two reasons: all firms are assumed to pay the
highest rate instead of the more relevant revenue neutral flat rate. It is difficult to understand
why the widely accepted conventional methodology of comparative studies on tax systems has
not been followed here (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1999). Second, it is assumed that the subsidy is
not shifted on to the employees at all. This question is discussed further below.
Maybe even more important than the estimated magnitude of the benefit, is the symbolic
political importance attached to the issue. Recommending the ratification of the EEA
Agreement, the Government wrote to the Parliament (Proposition No. 100, 1991-92, p. 376):
“The Government’s opinion is that the regional differentiation of employers’ social security
contributions can and shall be continued.”
The purpose of this paper is to present an economic analysis of the case. Although, by now,
the court has ruled in favour of ESA and dismissed the Norwegian application for annulment,
we may still ask how reasonable the judgement is from an economic point of view and suggest
some answers to the likely consequences.
In the next section (Section 2) a brief outline of the Norwegian system, the modifications of
the system requested by ESA, and the economic arguments of the two sides are presented. In
Section 3 a simplifying model in the new economic geography tradition, suitable for a formal
discussion of the effects of modifying regional policy, is suggested. Section 4 to 8 present the
model in more detail. Partial and general equilibrium solutions under alternative assumptions
are presented in Section 9 to 11. Section 12 concludes.
2. Description
Compulsory social security contributions levied on employers were introduced in 1966 (Act of
17 June 1966 no. 12), but it was not until 1975 that the rate paid was regionally differentiated
(Ot. Prp. No. 12, 1974-75). When the system was first implemented in January 1976, there
were 3 tax zones with tax rates ranging from 14 to 17 per cent, replacing the previous flat rate
of 16.7 per cent. For practical reasons, differentiation was linked to place of residence of the
employee, not the location of work place. The tax base was the gross salary or the payroll. In
principle, the system remains unchanged, but today there are 5 zones with tax rates ranging
from zero to 14.1 per cent. It is estimated that a flat rate of 12.6 per cent would generate the
same revenues (Application for annulment to the EFTA Court, the Government of Norway,
September 2 1998, p. 3).
Already at this point there are several remarks that need to be made. Since this is in effect a
differentiation of payroll tax rates, there will be carry over effects.  As is well known from the
economic literature on tax incidence, a tax formally levied on the employer may de facto serve
as a tax on the employee (Hamermesh, 1993).  If we for the moment ignore carry over effects,
there will be cost advantages for firms hiring labour from assisted areas compared to the
previous flat rate system. Insofar as these firms compete internationally, they will get a
competitive advantage in relation to foreign rivals. However, equally important from an
international point of view, the firms hiring labour from central areas will get a competitive
disadvantage. In sum, it may therefore very well be that foreign firms competing in the same
markets will be better off with a tax neutral system of differentiation than no differentiation
although there may be losers as well as winners.3
According to ESA, several amendments have to be made in order to make the system
compatible with the EEA Agreement. Most notably, subsidies are in principle not to be granted
to firms with no alternative location (Dec. No. 165/98/COL, p.21).  No alternative location is
identified as natural resource based sectors like extractive industries and hydroelectric power
stations. Specifically ESA lists the following sectors (ibid., p.29):
“- enterprises engaged in Production and distribution of electricity (NACE 40.1)
- enterprises engaged in Extraction of crude petroleum and gas (NACE 11.10)
- enterprises engaged in Service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding
surveying (NACE 11.20)
- enterprises engaged in Mining of metal ores (NACE 13)
- enterprises engaged in relation to the extraction of the industrial minerals Nefeline syenite
(HS 2529.3000) and Olivine (HS 2517.49100)”
In the regional science literature, we find the idea that economic activities in a region can be
divided into an economic base sector exporting its output to the world outside, and a non-basic
sector serving the region (see, e.g. Armstrong and Taylor, 1985, ch. 1.2).
1 For peripheral
regions the world outside is often far away in a literal sense.  In the standard Weber-Lösch
model of location, firms choose location in order to economise on transport costs.  Hence, the
location of an economic base sector in a peripheral region far from the output market, reveals
that transport costs of a locally available input are so high that commercial firms have no
alternative but to locate at the source.
Now, there may be exceptions. For some firms located in peripheral regions, distance to the
market may be of minor importance. Examples are firms within the telecommunication industry
as well as service firms relying on modern telecommunications for market access and perhaps
even firms in the transport industry.  When transport costs do not matter much, cheap labour
may be sufficient to choose a remote location. The ESA decision is in effect covering this
possibility as well, since apart from the industry groups referred to above, the following groups
are also requested to pay the highest rate (Ibid, pp.29-30):
“- enterprises with more than 50 employees engaged in Freight transport by road (NACE
60.24)
- enterprises engaged in the Telecommunication sector  (NACE 64.20)
- enterprises having branch offices established abroad or otherwise being engaged in cross-
border activities related to the following sectors, namely, Fiancial intermediation (NACE 65),
Insurance and pension funding (NACE 66), and services auxilliary to financial intermediation
(NACE 67), with the exception of branch offices only providing local services.”
On basis of this, I think that the analytical distinction between an economic base and a non-
basic sector may serve as a useful taxonomy. Although there are some economic base
industries allowed to benefit from a lower rate, it is reasonable to argue that by and large the
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ESA decision amounts to request that economic base sectors covered by the EEA Agreement
pay the full rate, whereas non-basic sectors may continue to pay the reduced rate.
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The principal view of the Norwegian Government is that the differentiated payroll tax system is
part of the overall tax system and central to labour market policy. Since the State retain the
power of exercising both taxation and labour policy under the EEA Agreement, the payroll tax
system is outside the competence of both ESA and the Commission.
Although the Government emphasises the significance of the scheme for reducing
unemployment in assisted areas, the reason why this is of particular importance in the
Norwegian case is not explained.  It is an interesting point here of considerable importance to
the issue. The Norwegian labour market is exceptional at least in one respect: The highly
centralised bargaining institution is well alive and even strengthened in opposition to the more
general trend that national industrial relations systems appear to be moving towards greater
decentralisation (Marginson and Sisson, 1998, pp. 509-512). This peculiarity is recognised as
one of the most important factors explaining the relative success of Norwegian economic
policy as measured by unemployment rates compared to many member states of the European
Union. The importance attached to centralised bargaining is shown by the fact that the
Government has until recently been very reluctant to give up the fixed exchange rate policy in
spite of considerable pressure towards an exchange rate regime targeted at price stability. The
decisive argument seems to have been that a fixed exchange rate regime imposes discipline on
the bargaining parties by making them responsible for the consequences of the outcome. In our
context, the most interesting point about the centralised bargaining system is that, if
unchecked, the producer wage rate in peripheral areas is higher than the market clearing rate.
Demand for labour falls short of supply and there is unemployment that would not have arisen
in a more decentralised system. The other side of regional convergence in income for the
employed (the insiders) is regional divergence in employment opportunities for the unemployed
(the outsiders). The regionally differentiated payroll tax system may be essential in
compensating for this inefficiency.
3. Conceptual model
Let us partition the European Economic Area into three regions: Northern Norway (n),
southern Norway (s), and the European Union (u). To a first approximation we may consider n
to be the assisted area benefiting from a lower payroll tax rate than s. According to ESA, close
to 70 percent of total benefits accrue to n (Dec. No. 165/98/COL, p.6).To a first order of
approximation we may also ignore the small economies of Liechtenstein and Iceland, and
consider the EEA to consist of Norway and the EU, as noted by Baldwin et al. (1995). We
may say more than merely stating that we have three regions and impose some structure on the
classification along at least two dimensions. Home markets increase as we move from n by s to
u. Population is 0.51 mill., 3.85 mill., and 372.26 mill. We also know that transport costs
between n and u is higher than either between n and s or s and u. In the formal model to be
used, I will abstract from differences in marked size, but retain distance as an explanatory
factor.
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In each of the three regions there is an economic base sector, the B sector, and a non-basic
sector, the A sector. To simplify, I assume that the B sector produces only final goods, while
the A sector only produces intermediates. This means that we abstract from interregional trade
in intermediates. Technology is assumed identical in the three regions. The B sector produces
by means of B skilled labour and intermediates from the A sector. The consumers distinguish
the products from the B sectors of the three regions by origin only. Hence, output from
different firms of the same region is homogeneous. The firms are price takers in the output
market and use a constant to scale technology. The A sector produces differentiated
intermediates by means of a single input called A skilled labour. Due to fixed set up costs there
are internal increasing returns to scale. The market structure is monopolistic competition.
B skilled labour is immobile, whereas A skilled labour is mobile between n and s, except from
in the very short run.  We do not allow retraining. Following the new economic geography
tradition, regional equilibrium is obtained when perceived real wage of mobile labour is the
same in all feasible locations. We are going to consider two alternative institutional
arrangements in the labour market. First we will consider a competitive outcome in all labour
markets where supply equals demand. Next, we will look at a situation believed to be more in
line with the stylised facts of wage determination in Norway. A sector specific common wage
rate for s and n in the economic base sector is determined through central bargaining. In case
the bargaining wage is below the market clearing wage, wage drift sufficient to clear the
market is allowed at the firm level. The centrally bargained wage rate is a mark up over the
average competitive wage rate and constitute a floor so that wages are rigid downwards. In
this way, involuntary regional unemployment may arise in the peripheral region. The A sector
labour market is assumed to always clear.
Using this conceptual set up we are going to consider what happens when we introduce a tax
neutral regionally differentiated payroll tax/subsidy in Norway. We consider two alternatives:
an equal tax/subsidy across industries in accordance with the present scheme and a subsidy on
A skilled labour in n only in accordance with the ESA decision. The performance of the
alternatives are judged by reference to indicators,  representing different economic aspects:
market shares of n, s and u representing the competitive aspect, presumably of foremost
concern to the ESA and the EU Commission, and unemployment, income and diversity in n
representing regional policy aspects of concern to regional policymakers in Norway and
elsewhere.
4. Consumers
Consumers have identical preferences regardless of occupation and location of residence. This
is of course not very realistic, but convenient. Let us assume that the corresponding aggregate
expenditure system can be written
Acrobat Document (1)
Greek letters are parameters, sij is aggregate expenditure share in region j of the good
produced in region i, pij is delivered price and yij is quantity of the good. For the expenditure
shares to add  to unity,  1 = ￿ i a . Everybody supplies one unit of labour inelastically, receiving
vj/tjA and wj/tjB depending on skills. The producer wage rate in sector A is vj and in the B sector
wj, whereas tjA and tjB are the payroll tax factors (see Holmlund, 1989, p.98).  Individual
expenditure systems for A skilled and B skilled  consistent with (1) are6
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Hence, preferences are homothetic.
The present scheme of differentiated payroll tax rates may be imposed by setting
. 1 , , ” = ” = ” = uB uA s sB sA n nB nA t t t t t t t t (3)
The amendments requested by ESA mean
. 1 , , ” = ” = = ” „ uB uA s nB sB sA n nA nB t t t t t t t t t (4)
Here, no pay roll tax rates have been used as reference by setting the payroll tax factor equal to
unity in region u. In the remaining part of the paper I restrict generality of the payroll tax
system to the two schemes (3) and (4). If tax neutrality is to hold, we must have
). 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - = - + - s s Bn Bn An An t r t r t r (5)
Aggregate income in the A sector in region n is given by  An n n An t v m r / = , and aggregate
income in the B sector,  . / Bn n n Bn t w l r =  Here, mj and lj denote the number of A skilled and B
skilled in region j. Subsidies mean that the payroll tax factor is below unity in the assisted
region and/or sector, and above unity in the non-assisted area and/or sector.
Delivered prices are in general different from mill prices because of transport costs. Following
von Thünen (1826) and Samuelson (1952), I assume only  ij y  units arrive when  ij ij y t  units are
shipped. Hence,  ij t represent transport costs. The relationship between delivered prices and
mill prices are
. , , , , u s n j i p p i ij ij = =t (6)
I assume symmetry,  , ji ij t t = that  S ns su nu L t t t t t ” = > ” , and ignore domestic distribution
costs,  1 = ii t .
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Realistically, market shares should depend on income and relative prices. The model suggested
implies that market shares in value are constant, independent of  both income and relative
prices. This is not a desirable property per se, but a simplifying assumption. We are working on
a more general model with quasi homothetic preferences (Muelbauer, 1975), but the results are
not yet available.
5. The economic base sector
The economic base sector in a specific region consists of a large number of  firms with identical
constant returns to scale technology. Skipping indices for region in this and the following
Section, the unit cost function for a firm is written
( ) . 1 , ln ln / ln 0 = + + + = q w q w q w y c b b b b b (7)
Here, w is the wage rate paid by producers, q is a price index of inputs from the non-basic
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where qk is the price paid for input k, and s  is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of
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k z z . Here z is a quantity index of intermediates and zk is the quantity of input k.
This technology has several attractive properties: a) The cost function is separable in w and q,
b) costs decrease since productivity increases by the number of inputs from the non-basic
sector, and c) no input from the non-basic sector is essential. Property a) implies that the cost
minimising firm may proceed in two steps: first, it may choose how much labour, l, and
aggregate input, z, to use conditional on any output level, y. Second, conditional on the
optimal level of z, it may choose how much to use of the different inputs from the non-basic
sector, zk. Property b) means that increased specialisation in the non-basic sector rather than
subdivision of labour within a single firm, raises productivity. Property c) implies that the
degree of specialisation within any region is endogeneous.












and from (8) we obtain sub cost shares
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We may write (10) as  ( ) q q z k k ln ln ln - = - s  for any k, including k=s. Differentiating
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When specialisation increases, the sub cost share for input s goes to zero and the demand
elasticity is simply equal to the elasticity of substitution.
The level of output is determined by assuming that profits are zero due to free entry and exit.
6. The non-basic sector
The non-basic sector, the A sector, is also assumed to consist of firms with identical
technology, but this time increasing returns to scale internal to the firms because of set up
costs. The cost function for firm k is written,
v z b k k ) ( 0 1 V V + = (12)
Here, bk is total costs and v is the producer wage rate prevailing in the non-basic sector. The
primal to (12) is   1 0 / ) ( V V - = k k m z , where mk is labour input. Marginal cost is  v 1 V and the set
up cost is v 0 V . With internal economies of scale, there must be some kind of imperfect
competition to obtain market equilibrium. Following most of the literature in the new
economic geography tradition, let us assume that market structure is monopolistic competition.














Assuming specialisation is sufficient to substitute s  for  k e  (cfr. eq. (11)), the profit
maximising price for each differentiated product is equal to a constant mark up over marginal
cost,






Monopolistic competition implies that profits vanish in equilibrium,
0 = - k k k b z q . (15)
Substituting for  k q  from (14) and bk from (12), we obtain the equilibrium output,
1
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If we set  0 V and  1 V  in such a way that  1 1 / 1 0 1 - ” - ” s V V , we may write
. 1 , / 1 , = = = k k k m z v q s s (17)
In order to fully characterise the sector, what remains is the degree of specialisation or the
diversity as measured by the number of available products and the equilibrium wage rate. This
is also the number of firms since it is not profitable for two firms to produce the same product,
and by the normalisation, (17), it is also the number of labour units employed in the sector. We
turn to these issues next, as we look at the labour markets in the economy.
7. Labour markets
I have assumed that people inelastically supplies one unit of labour each, that they are either A
skilled or B skilled and that they cannot be retrained. The number of B skilled people in each
region is fixed,  u s n l l l , , . So is the number of A skilled in region u,  u m , whereas region n and s
share a common pool of mobile A skilled workers, m. We must have
u u m m £ ,  u u l l £ ,  m m m s n £ + ,  n n l l £ , and  s s l l £ . (18)
Mobile workers do not consider amenities and locate wherever perceived real wages are
highest. In spatial equilibrium perceived real wages in the A sector in region n and s must be
equal. Workers observe their nominal wage rates in alternative locations and calculate real
wages on basis of information on regional consumer price indices,  . , , s n j cpij =  In equilibrium
we must then have
( ) ( ) ( ) s n sA s nA n cpi cpi t v t v / ln / ln / ln + = , (19)
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In the very short run I assume that even A skilled labour cannot move, in which case I replace
(18) and (19) by
u u m m £ ,  u u l l £ ,  . , , , , s s n n s n s s n n l l l l m m m m m m m £ £ = + £ £ (21)
By (17), we know that the number of firms in the A sector is equal to the number of labour
units. Hence,
) ln( ) ln( ), ln( ) ln( ), ln( ) ln( n n s s u u m k m k m k = = = (22)
We also know by (17) that qk is equal for all k in one region. Using (8) and (22), we may write9
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Turning to the B sector, by (9) we have
. , , ), ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 0 u s n i y q w l i i q i q w i = + + - + = b b b b (24)
Let us start out by looking at the very short run under labour market clearing so that we have
full employment, i.e., all the restrictions given by (21) are binding. We may use (23) and (24)
to solve for equilibrium wage rates in both sectors in all regions, 
*
n v , 
*
s v , 
*
u v , 
*
n w , 
*
s w , and 
*
u w ,
conditional on A sector product price indices,  n q ,  s q , and  u q , and B sector output,  n y ,  s y ,
and  u y .
When we allow mobility, (19) is valid, along with (23) and (24). When (18) is binding, we may
use the three equations to solve for equilibrium wage rates conditional on the same set of
variables as before and the consumer price indices of region n and s.
Under the alternative wage determination regime with centralised bargaining in the B sector,
universal market clearing in the labour markets do not hold in general. Let us use the
monopoly union model, where the union maximises utility as a function of the consumer wage
and employment, subject to labour demand (see, e.g., Oswald, 1985). Assuming a utilitarian
union,  the bargaining consumer wage rate, w , is obtained from  { } ) )( ( s n w l l w U Max + . The
utility function will be fully specified later on. When wage drift eliminates upward pressure, the
consumer wage rates in sector B in region n and s are  [ ] w t w max jB j , /
* . In order to find the
solution to this problem, as well as the unconditional solutions under universal market clearing,
we need the full general equilibrium solution of the model. Let us therefore move on to the
product markets.
8. Product markets
Since zk according to (17) is equal to  s / 1  and ki is equal to mi, aggregate supply from the A
sector in region i is
s s
s
/ 1 - = i i m z   (25)
whereas demand is obtained from (9). Equating supply and demand, the market clearing
condition is therefore
. , , ), ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
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In the B sector, we know that profits vanish in equilibrium,
. , , ), log( ) log( ) log( 0 u s n i q w p i q i w i = + + = b b b (27)
With free trade for B sector goods we must have balance-of-payments equilibrium,
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Adding up implies that only two of the three equations of (28) are independent. Hence, we
have one degree of freedom and may choose one of the variables as numéraire, say B sector
wage rate in region u,  1 ” u w , and arbitrarily drop one of the restrictions that is redundant, say
the balance-of-payment restriction for region u.10
Adding (26) and (28) to (23) and (24), when (21) is binding, we can find equilibrium wage
rates in the case of labour market clearing in the very short run, conditional on the numéraire.
Adding (27), we can solve for B sector product prices and obtain the complete partial
equilibrium solution.
Adding (26), (27) and (28) to (19), (23) and (24), when (18) is binding, we can find the full
general equilibrium solution when A sector labour is mobile.
9. Partial equilibrium
Let us start out ignoring migration and look at the short run equilibrium. Subtracting (26) from
(24), and taking into account that  i i m m =  and  i i l l = , I obtain
. ln ln
1
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-
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Substituting for  i q ln  from (29) in (23), we get
. ln ln ln ) / ln( ln i i i w q i w m l v + - + = b b (30)
Substituting for  i q ln  in (27) as well, we obtain the output price for the B sector,
. ln ln
1
ln ln ln ln i i q i q q w i w m l p +
-
+ + + - - =
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b b s b b b (31)
Output from the B sector is most easily obtained using the primal,
. ln
1
ln ln ln i q i w q i m l y
-
+ + - =
s
s
b b s b b (32)
As far as aggregate income is concerned, we need to take into account that the payroll tax
factor is allowed to be different between region n, s and u, and between the A sector and B
sector in region n. Aggregate income in region n is


















































































Let us abstract from differences in marked size and assume that all Engel curves have the same
slope, i.e. all li and all  i a  are equal. Let us also simplify by setting  q w b b =  and  i i l m =  for all






































Adding (5) to (37), we may solve for equilibrium producer wage rates under tax neutrality. I
have illustrated the solution graphically in Figure 1, setting the payroll tax factor in the assisted
area or region equal to 9/10. There are two sets of solutions corresponding to the two payroll
tax regimes. In the Norwegian regime, the payroll tax factor is equal for both sectors in region
n, i.e.,  10 / 9 = = Bn An t t , and the tax neutral payroll tax factor in region s using (5), is
10 / 11 = s t . The solid lines represent the balance-of-payment restrictions for region s ( steepest
slope) and n. The intersection represents the solution,  90 . 0 / = u n w w  and  10 . 1 / = u s w w . In the
ESA regime, only  10 / 9 = An t . Tax neutrality gives  04 . 1 = = s Bn t t . The dashed lines in Figure 1
represent the balance-of-payment restrictions under this regime, intersecting at  96 . 0 / = u n w w
and  04 . 1 / = u s w w .
Figure 1. Equilibrium producer wage rates.
Balance of payment restrictions in region n and s under the Norwegian
regime (solid lines) and the ESA regime (dashed lines).
What are the consequences in terms of real income in the different regions when the ESA
regime replaces the Norwegian? In our model, the answer is none. However, with more
general preferences (quasi-homotheticity), changing regime would have had an effect: region n
would be worse off and region s better off, i.e., the ESA regime implies larger regional
inequality.  Throughout, I have used the software program Mathematica￿ to simulate the
impact of changing the regime (Wolfram, 1991). The real income in s is higher than in n and u
since lower transport costs make delivered prices lower than elsewhere.
Region Norwegian regime ESA regime
n 100 100
s 106 106
Table 1. Real income.12
Per cent of real income in region u.
Please, note that under our assumptions, the figures in Table 1 pertain to aggregate income, as
well as individual income.
What are the consequences for the competitive position in terms of market shares? Table 2
provides an answer, using the same set of parameter values as before.
Region of origin Market n Market s Market u
n -5.51 (0.44) -6.48 (0.34) -6.43 (0.30)
s 7.35 (0.29) 6.24 (0.35) 6.31 (0.29)
u 1.16 (0.27) 1.11 (0.31) 0.17 (0.41)
Table 2. Changes in marked shares.
ESA regime replacing Norwegian regime. Percentage change (market shares under Norwegian
regime in parenthesis).
The figures in parenthesis are market shares under the Norwegian regime. Market shares are
computed using volume, not value. Replacing the Norwegian regime by the ESA regime, the
market shares of the product from region n fall in all markets. Region u increases their shares,
but perhaps less than hoped for by supporters of the ESA decision since tax neutrality implies
that the winning region is s.
10. General equilibrium
Let us now look at the situation when A skilled labour is mobile between region n and s. Based
on the same set of parameter values as before, the balance-of-payment restrictions, (37),
remain valid. Let us set  2 1 1 = + ” + = s n m m m . We need the mobility equilibrium condition,
(19), to obtain the number of A skilled workers in region n, mn. Using (26), mill prices are
. 2 ,
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By the analogue to (29),  i i i i l w m v =  (when  q w b b = ). The equlibrium condition (19) can then
be written,13
.












Substituting for cpin and cpis from (39), and wn and ws from the previous section, I solve for mn.
Under the Norwegian regime, the solution is 0.9696, under the ESA regime 1.0036. This
means that changing regime increases population and the number of differentiated inputs  in the
north. In this sense, the regional performance of changing regime is improved.
Although mobility makes no difference as far as relative real aggregate regional income is
concerned, we get a richer picture when we look at relative real individual income. Since
mobility implies that the number of residents is endogeneous, relative real individual income is
no longer identical to the aggregate.  Let us therefore look at the micro situation.
Region Sector Norwegian regime ESA regime
n A 103.13 106.66
B 100.00 92.95
s A 103.13 106.66
B 106.27 106.27
Table 3. Real individual income.
Per cent of real individual income in region u.
Table 3 presents individual income or wage rates. The real wage in the A sector is equal
irrespective of region by the spatial equilibrium condition. The ESA regime means relative real
wages fall in the B sector in the north and rise in the A sector. The income distribution
becomes more unequal. Hence, the Norwegian regime is performing better from an egalitarian
regional point of view.
Moving on to the effects of changing regimes for marked shares, the results are presented in
Table 4.
Region of origin Market n Market s Market u
n -2.68 (0.43) -3.16 (0.33) -3.14 (0.29)
s 3.28 (0.30) 2.77 (0.36) 2.79 (0.30)
u 0.65 (0.27) 0.15 (0.31) 0.17 (0.41)
Table 4. Changes in marked shares.
ESA regime replacing Norwegian regime. Percentage change (market shares under Norwegian
regime in parenthesis).
The partial equilibrium results are confirmed. The south is the big winner and the north an even
bigger looser, leaving a small net gain to the union.
11. Industry wide wage bargaining
The system of wage determination in Norway is highly centralised, as explained in Section 2. It
is therefore not reasonable that there should be universal market clearing in all labour markets,
as if there were perfect competition. I am now going to investigate what happens when we
introduce centralised bargaining in the economic base sector along the lines suggested in
Section 7.14
The union maximises a utilitarian utility function subject to labour demand in the B sector. The
bargaining wage is given by
{ } ) )( ( arg s n l l w U max w + = . (41)
Recall that w is the consumer wage rate. The union knows that labour will be adjusted
according to (9), leaving the cost share constant. Substituting for li from (9), taking the partial
derivative with respect to w, we obtain the first order condition for the problem,
. 0 ) / ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )( ( = - - ¢ + w w U w U l l w s n b (42)
In order to have an explicit solution for the bargaining wage, the utility function must be
specified. It is convenient to choose
), ln( ) ( 1 0 w w U j j + = (43)
and to set  1 0 = j  and  2 / 1 1 = j . Using  2 / 1 = w b  as before, the solution is simply  1 = w . The
producer wage rates under the Norwegian regime is then identical to the situation with market
clearing and the results from the previous section apply. Under the ESA regime, the bargaining
wage will still clear the market in s, but not in n:
* * 96 . 0 03 . 1 , 03 . 1 n s n s s s w w t w w w t w = > = = = = = .
Hence, there is unemployment among the B skilled in n (7 per cent). Compared to the market
clearing case, there is a slight decrease in the number of A skilled locating in n and an increase
in the A sector wage rate. Real wage rates comparable to the content of Table 3 is presented in
Table 5. Real wages under the Norwegian regime with and without bargaining is of course
identical by construction, but are repeated here for ease of comparison.
Region Sector Norwegian regime ESA regime
n A 103.13 106.66
B 100.00 100.00
s A 103.13 106.66
B 106.27 106.27
Table 5. Real wage.
Per cent of real wage in region u.
The ESA regime benefits the insiders on expense of the outsiders: the relative real wage among
the employed is increasing or remain constant, whereas there is an increase in the number of
unemployed in the peripheral region. From another perspective, mobile labour is better off
while immobile labour is worse off.
As far as market shares are concerned, market shares under the Norwegian regime are again
the same as before. The changes in market shares, comparable to the content of Table 4, are
presented in Table 6.
Region of origin Market n Market s Market u
n -4.74 (0.43) -5.54 (0.33) -5.66 (0.29)
s 4.86 (0.30) 3.97 (0.36) 3.84 (0.30)
u 2.19 (0.27) 1.32 (0.31) 1.19 (0.41)
Table 6. Changes in marked shares.15
ESA regime replacing Norwegian regime. Percentage change (market shares under Norwegian
regime in parenthesis).
Although the percentage changes in market shares when the ESA regime is replacing the
Norwegian, are larger than when all markets were clearing, the qualitative effects are the same,
and qualitative effects are all that matter here. The winning region is s, but n is losing even
more, giving Norway a net loss.
12. Concluding discussion
According to the model employed, the regional impact of replacing the present regime of
differentiated payroll tax rates with the regime proposed by the EFTA Surveillance Authority,
is mixed. On the one hand, diversity in the non basic economic sector in the assisted area is
increased leading to higher productivity. On the other hand, unemployment in the area will
increase in case wages are rigid downwards, and real wages in the base sector will fall in case
wages are flexible. From a regional policy point of view, the negative effects would probably
be considered more important than the positive effect.
The change in regime leads to an increase in marked shares for products from the European
Union in all markets. The assisting area of Norway increases its market shares even more,
leaving the assisted area as the big looser since this is a zero-sum game. One may wonder
however, how robust this conclusion is when differences in marked size are accounted for. It
would be an interesting extension to introduce marked size as an explanatory factor, but then
the simple model used would have to be changed in other ways as well, most notably
expenditure shares could not be equal for all goods in all regions.
Another interesting issue for more research, is the effect of more general preferences. As
already mentioned in the text, work is being done based on quasi-homothetic preferences. If
this work succeed, conclusions would no longer be conditional on the presumably restrictive
assumption of income independent expenditure shares.
The decision by the EFTA Court leaves the Norwegian Government with no other choice than
to find alternative instruments if the regional effects, under the ESA regime, is considered
unacceptable. An interesting policy option that could easily be analysed within the present
framework is infrastructure investments reducing transport costs. There are already several
studies on this subject (Martin and Rogers, 1995a and 1995b, and Kilkenny, 1997), but the
work should be extended to non-clearing labour markets. As long as there is no harmonisation
of public infrastructure investment criteria in the European Economic Area, state aid rules
would not apply to provision of infrastructure.
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